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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we present a first attempt to develop a representative and flexible 
static tax-benefit microsimulation model, based on an exact match among a 
representative sample survey of the Italian income and living conditions in 
2009-2010, provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics, and corresponding 
personal income tax returns, as well as cadastral data of the real estate 
properties of each individual, provided by the Department of Finance of the 
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on the same tax year. This static tax-
benefit model can evaluate tax revenue and the redistributive impact of 
property and personal income taxation based on income types and levels 
actually declared with details of tax deductions. It should allow more reliable 
and detailed results compared to those based only on survey data and incomes 
declared to interviewers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we first present a static tax-benefit microsimulation model 
developed from 2012 by the research unit of the Department of Finance of the 
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (hereafter MEF) for study purposes, 
and then we show a first application. 
The microsimulation model here discussed is based on both a representative 
sample survey (hereafter SILC Dataset) of the Italian incomes and living 
conditions in 2009-2010 made available by the Italian Institute of Statistics 
(hereafter ISTAT) and the corresponding administrative tax data (personal tax 
returns and cadastral data of real estate properties) of each individual within 
SILC Dataset on the same fiscal year made available by MEF. 
Written in both STATA and SPSS, the model is primarily aimed at studying 
revenues and impacts of fiscal policies (personal income tax, housing taxation, 
family allowance, social contributions) with the redistributive impact at both 
individual and household level. It has further applications, such as the 
evaluation of global comprehensive personal income, the analysis of a broader 
range of tax measures, a quantification of tax erosion and a measure of the 
share of tax evasion derived by difference among tax return income and that 
declared by respondents in the survey sample. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the 
reasons that induced the MEF to develop its own microsimulation model. 
Section 3 describes the three datasets employed in developing our 
microsimulation model, and emphasizes strengths and weaknesses of each 
dataset. Section 4 presents the main structure of the microsimulation model, 
whilst Section 5 offers a comparison between the microsimulation model and 
the official statistics of the year to which the data refer (2009). Section 6 offers 
some applications of the microsimulation model on the 2013 tax year. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Reasons and opportunities for an exact match approach 
 
Several reasons induced the MEF to develop its own microsimulation 
model. First of all, although tax authorities have information on all tax returns 
filled in by Italian individual taxpayers, there is no way to extend such huge set 
of information for analysing the impact of taxes and transfers to the household 
level (as from family registry) using administrative data, since tax return forms 
are collected and observable only for the “fiscal family”.1 This is a strong 
                                                 
1 Usually sample surveys consider a household as a group of individuals who live 
together. On the contrary, this classification is not possible when considering administrative 
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limitation of the administrative data, since the ability to observe socio-
economic characteristics at household level is essential for analysing the 
effects of tax reforms. 
On the other hand, even if several static tax-benefit microsimulation models 
based on sample surveys have been proposed in Italy during the past three 
decades (Marenzi, 1989; Bernardi et al., 1992, Di Biase et al., 1995; Rizzi, 
1996, Brandolini, 1999, Proto, 1999, Baldini, 2000; D’Amuri and Fiorio, 2006, 
Maitino and Sciclone, 2008, Fiorio, 2008; Department of Treasury, 2010; 
Pellegrino et al., 2011, Baldini et al., 2015, among others), they encounter 
some difficulty for a good approximation of the real estate distribution among 
households as well as the actual impact of the tax system, based on incomes 
declared in tax return. 
Two are the basic limits of this kind of models. First, they are based only on 
survey data and related declared incomes, so that by definition they cannot take 
advantages of both real level and the particularly detailed set of information 
collected in the tax return forms. As a consequence, their results are more 
reliable when focusing on a high share of taxpayers and/or the main features of 
a tax. Second, by employing a complex set of procedures and hypothesis, the 
survey-based models estimate each taxpayer’s gross income (and net tax 
liability as well as social security contributions) starting from the net one stated 
by the interviewed.2 They also face specific problems for neutralising over-
reporting, under-reporting or misclassification of specific income issues or real 
estate properties (particularly under-reported in surveys, less than fifty per cent 
respect to cadastral data information; see Pellegrino et al., 2011, on this point). 
On the contrary, by matching real tax return forms and real estate properties 
for each individual in SILC Dataset, the model here presented does not suffer 
of these kind of approximations, over-reporting or under-reporting, since the 
transition from the gross to the net income is made possible by algorithms 
replicating all the variables of each kind of income form filled in by each 
taxpayer. 
Finally, in Italy, few attempts have been proposed for presenting gross and 
net individual income distribution starting from tax return forms. A first 
                                                                                                                 
data and tax return forms. This is due to the set of information collected by tax authorities. 
Let’s take an example. Consider a household composed by father, mother and son; they live 
together. The father and the son are employees, whilst the mother is a housewife who earns 
no money. From a sample survey point of view they form a household. From the 
administrative data point of view these three individuals form two distinct fiscal families: 
the first fiscal family is composed by the spouses (the husband fills in the tax return form 
with a dependent spouse and zero dependent sons), whilst the second one is composed by 
the son himself. 
2 These models often simulate all the particularities of the tax system by adopting an 
adequate net-to-gross procedure, as proposed by Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001), and 
they have to be based on the most reliable set of survey data (Ceriani et al., 2013). 
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attempt was made by Di Nicola and Monteduro (2004), who implemented a 
dataset for the Italian Personal Income Tax (hereafter PIT) by selecting a 
highly representative sample (above 350,000 taxpayers) among all individual 
PIT tax returns in the fiscal year 2000. More recently, Betti et al. (2011) 
proposed a net-to gross procedure for SILC Dataset income variables, and this 
partially employs tax return forms. It has to be noted that the SILC Dataset net-
to gross procedure is not available for researchers, so that only the pre- and 
post-tax global income distributions can be observed. This is the most relevant 
limit for the SILC Dataset to be employed for some study purposes. 
Baldini et al. (2006) presented a review of measurement errors in the 
reports of incomes and the comparisons of individual income in an interview 
with the individual income recorded in the tax form produced by the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance. The comparison was possible by an exact match 
among survey and fiscal data and, a relevant difference between the two source 
is shown. 
In order to overcome these limitations, MEF decided to develop its own 
microsimulation model. The entire analysis has been managed by a basic 
principle of maximizing information within the three datasets we employed to 
define a broad and articulated picture of the Italian population and its tax 
situation, with particular emphasis on the socio-economic characteristics of 
Italian households. Finally, simulations were carried out in two steps. As all 
datasets we employed refer to the 2009 fiscal year. We first refer to this fiscal 
year as a benchmark analysis; then, population, incomes, fiscal rules and 
results are updated to the 2013 fiscal year. 
These are important innovations, as up to now administrative data have 
been employed to study the redistributive effect of taxation on individual 
taxpayers, without a full representation of households and entire population. 
However, in Italy the “classic” microsimulation models, which also allow for 
analysis on households, are based, as observed, only on survey data, and are 
able to catch with approximations both declared income and paid taxes to tax 
authorities. 
 
 
3. The Original Datasets and the Integrated Dataset Used for 
Simulations 
 
3.1 Overall review 
 
Input data combine three different datasets, and two of them are based only 
on administrative data. The integration of these databases has not occurred by 
making use of statistical criteria, but in a timely manner that couples 
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information from multiple databases on the basis of an individual identifier.3 In 
order to consider a representative sample of the Italian population, we make 
use of the 2010 SILC survey on income and living conditions provided by 
ISTAT on the 2009 fiscal year. This survey contains information on the 
demographic characteristics of Italian individuals and households, as well as 
their corresponding estimated gross and net incomes by type4, including 
exemptions, as social pensions, subsidies, social safety nets, family allowances. 
The survey covers 19,147 households and 47,551 individuals, and it is also 
representative at regional level. Whilst information on the main residences is 
fully registered, few data are available on second homes and buildings; 
moreover, only aggregate information by income sources is registered. SILC 
Dataset also shows the sample weight for each household (each individual 
within the household has the same household weight). First, we considered a 
grossing up procedure by applying the original sample weight. Next, as ISTAT 
sample weight were designed for demographic representativeness, we 
reassigned a sample weight to each individual in order for the grossing up 
procedure to give a better adherence with respect to that – referred to taxpayers 
– observed within the official statistics made available by MEF. 
Using the sample selected by ISTAT (SILC Dataset), we were able to 
observe each individual of the sample together with their whole personal 
income tax return presented in 2010, with reference to the 2009 fiscal year 
(PIT Data), as well as all information on their real estate properties (Real 
Estate Data) provided by MEF, and always with reference to the same fiscal 
year. 
A limited misalignment of some information concerning individuals we 
used in the surveys may be registered.5 All mismatches were fixed by re-
                                                 
3 The exact match was made possible by employing the tax code observed for almost all 
individuals in each of the three datasets we employed. The tax code of each interviewer 
within the SILC Dataset was provided by ISTAT to the Department of Finance. Having 
identified the corresponding tax return forms, the Department of Finance supplied to us the 
three dataset containing an anonymous individual identifier for each respondent, instead of 
her tax code, in order to ensure anonymity of taxpayers. 
4 Note that the algorithm for the transition from pre- to post-tax incomes is not made 
available by ISTAT. 
5 Three examples can clarify this issue: a) within SILC Dataset some observations had a 
different age or sex compared to those inferred from the tax return (this was primarily due to 
a reshuffling of individuals within a household belonging to SILC Dataset); b) an individual 
owns her main residence starting from 2010: she correctly completed the answer within the 
SILC Dataset questionnaire, but she does not own the main residence according to PIT and 
Real Estate Data; c) an individual begins retirement in 2010, and now registers herself as 
pensioner and former employee within SILC Dataset, but she still appears to be an employee 
within PIT and Real Estate Data. Making up the integrated dataset, we considered all these 
anomalies by preserving as much detail as possible, as well as referring all information to 
the 2009 fiscal and income year. 
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examining any individuals showing such problems and changing the variables 
where necessary. However, we were not able to check all possible mismatches 
among our three datasets, but the integration helped to correct about one third 
of cases and to apply the specific tax rules. 
Together, these three datasets give a broad set of information for all 
incomes and real estate properties of the Italian population. In order for the 
whole set of information to be fully implemented within the microsimulation 
model, several procedures and manipulations were carried out. These are 
explained in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.2. IT-SILC – European Union statistics on income and living 
conditions in Italy (SILC Dataset) 
 
SILC Dataset gathers socio-economic information of each individual within 
the sample by collecting answers to the completed questionnaires.6 Its most 
relevant information, used and implemented for the microsimulation model, 
can be grouped in three categories: a) socio-economic characteristics of the 
household and each component; b) net income sources (employment and 
incomes); and c) real estate owned. 
For category (a) we obtained information on region of residence, 
composition of household, personal data of each member of the household: 
sex, status in household, marital status, educational qualification, disabilities. 
For category (b) we observed employment status, job title, type of work, sector 
of activity, type of employer, number of hours worked, type of pensioner, 
income sources (income from employment, self-employment, pension, atypical 
work, unemployment and mobility benefit, scholarship, financial assets, real 
estate, other sources of income such as alimony, income support, regular and 
occasional gifts or cash). 
Finally, for category (c) we obtained information on real estate owned by 
the household and individuals. Information on the main residence is accurate: 
tenure status and individual share of ownership of the main residence, year of 
construction, number of rooms, surface area of the dwelling in squared metres, 
rent payment, kind of landlord, imputed rent, amount and term of the 
mortgage, mortgage payment, market value of the home. Information on other 
real estate, on the contrary, is only partial: number of other dwellings, imputed 
rent, and rent received. 
Most of the social and demographic characteristics available in the 2010 
SILC Dataset refer to the year 2010, whilst all economic characteristics refer to 
                                                 
6 For an exhaustive discussion on sample selection and a description of the whole set of 
variables see the SILC Dataset documentation. 
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the 2009 fiscal year, consistently with European EUROSTAT approach for 
EU-SILC national surveys. 
 
3.3. Personal income tax returns (PIT Dataset) 
 
Information on each individual’s tax return is made available by MEF only 
for internal use. Here, we obtain approximately 3,000 variables, as all the 
qualitative and quantitative information of each tax return is available. As we 
will see later in greater detail, the most important variables concern the 
transition from pre- to post-tax income (tax deductions and allowances, taxable 
income, gross tax liability, tax credits, net tax liability, regional and municipal 
surtaxes), and sections of the tax return regarding dependent individuals, 
buildings owned, sources of incomes and items of expenditures.7 It should be 
noted that one of the main tools of the microsimulation model is the evaluation 
of specific STATA and SPSS algorithms for replying all features of the tax 
returns. 
But also availability of each kind of fiscally defined and declared income is 
relevant for modelling actual vs hypothetical tax and benefit system. 
                                                 
7 More precisely, given the 47,551 individuals within the SILC Dataset, all records 
within PIT Dataset were matched: 31,082 of them have both an accurate and reliable 
individual identifier and a corresponding tax return registered by the tax authority; 14,355 
individuals have a reliable individual identifier but no tax return (children and other persons 
without income, as well as persons not obliged to present the tax return, such as, under 
specific conditions, individuals with only income from buildings); for the residual 2,114 
persons the individual identifier could not be observed within IT-SILC. Focusing on the type 
of tax return, 7,913 individuals presented the standard tax return (the so-called “Unico” tax 
return according to the Italian administrative system); 14,495 individuals presented a 
simplified tax return reserved to persons without self employed activity (the so-called “730” 
tax return); for 8,674 individuals, who earned only retirement income or employment, as 
well as coordinate collaboration incomes and, optionally, the cadastral income of the main 
residence, income information was directly communicated to the tax authorities by the 
employer (the “770” tax return); 928 taxpayers supposedly presented a tax return, but this 
could not be observed as the absence of a reliable individual identifier; and finally, 15,541 
individuals were not obliged to present a tax return to the authorities (e.g. those aged less 
than 15 years old, as well as those with no source of income). As mentioned above, for a 
few taxpayers (2,114) within SILC Dataset, ISTAT did not coupled survey information and 
an individual identifier. Among these, 928 individuals completed the questionnaire 
registering income sources. Almost certainly, these individuals were income earners during 
the fiscal year 2009. However, due to the lack of an individual identifier, we were not able 
to verify if they were taxpayers for the tax authorities. Moreover, among individuals 
characterized by a regular individual identifier, some completed the questionnaire by stating 
they were income earners even if they did not complete the tax return. In order to consider 
these issues, we decided to define tax variables used in the microsimulation model according 
to dual criteria. 
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For individuals within SILC Dataset, with a correct corresponding tax 
return within PIT Dataset, we used information contained in the tax return. For 
individuals declaring taxable incomes within SILC Dataset, but without a tax 
return within PIT Dataset, in some cases8 we accepted the income information 
within SILC Dataset and processed it as truthful tax information. 
As a consequence of all these income integrations derived from the exact 
match among SILC and PIT Datasets, it was possible to separate fiscal 
declared from other incomes, catching the presence of a relevant shadow 
economy, also involving employees figures. 
 
3.4. Land and building register (Real Estate Data) 
 
Differently from other existing microsimulation models, the one here 
presented pays particular attention to buildings and their tax regime, and has to 
be considered supplementary compared to the PIT structure. Moreover, unlike 
the microsimulation models based only on survey data, a full set of 
administrative microdata on buildings was duly employed to apply the PIT and 
property tax regimes. As the survey data for buildings owned is only partial, 
and it is subject to strong underreporting and some approximations (e.g. it does 
not provide the municipal location of the building), this is essential for the 
estimation of municipality income and property taxes, as well as distributional 
analysis based on capital income and global actual income. The information we 
obtained within Real Estate Data are: the cadastral value of each building, type 
of use, share of ownership, municipality where the building is located, property 
tax due, and, most importantly, the cadastral category of each building. 
Income tax return is indeed not the only source of administrative data for 
what concerns real estate properties owned by each taxpayer. The land and 
building register (the Italian so-called “catasto edilizio urbano”) gives a set of 
complementary and control information for at least three reasons. 
First, for taxpayers completing “730” tax return and “740” tax return (about 
two-thirds of overall PIT taxpayers), the information on properties owned is 
registered both within Datasets 2 and 3. As a consequence, Real Estate Data 
acts as a control set of information for properties declared within PIT Data. 
Moreover, Datasets 2 and 3 differ for two variables:9 the number of days of 
                                                 
8 Two types of individuals belong to this group: those declaring within SILC Dataset to 
be public employees or pensioners, regardless of their individual identifiers; and those 
characterized by a missing or incorrect individual identifier, and only earning other income 
sources declared within SILC Dataset, and not declared within PIT Data. 
9 Information within PIT Data also registers the “particular cases” according to PIT tax 
law. In these circumstances, a specific tax regime has to be applied to determine the income 
from buildings to be considered within the PIT base. Moreover, whenever the building 
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ownership of each building is registered only within PIT Data, whilst the 
cadastral category of each building is shown only within Real Estate Data. 
Both of these variables are relevant for full information on owned properties, 
as one of the main targets of the microsimulation model is also evaluation of 
the property tax. 
Second, even if the situation has improved in recent years, about one 
million buildings registered within Real Estate Data are not declared by 
taxpayers within PIT Data (ghost buildings). As a consequence, by exploiting 
this difference we are able to assess a complete picture of tax evasion on 
buildings within the PIT. 
Third, taxpayers whose gross income equals the cadastral income of the 
main residence and taxpayers whose only income (almost solely cadastral) is 
less than 500 euro from buildings, as well as taxpayers filling in the “770” tax 
return (about one third of overall PIT taxpayers), do not have to certify the 
ownership of the main residence within the tax return. In these cases, real 
properties owned are registered only in Real Estate Data. 
The weak point of the land and building register (Real Estate Data) is in its 
updating. We obtained a complete picture of the 2009 tax year, but this register 
is not guaranteed to be up to date for all individuals. In order to consider this 
issue, if the information on buildings is missing within PIT and Real Estate 
Datasets, even if expected, we check for differences by using SILC Dataset. In 
general, if information was available from two or three sources, we adopted 
this information. Considering the traditional reticence to declare all properties 
owned, this kind of “multiple sources integration” allowed us to obtain by far 
more reliable picture of real estate owned by each individual. 
For giving a reliable idea of real estate underreporting in Italian surveys, 
Table 1 shows rents or imputed rents estimation based only on SILC and on 
integrated datasets, distinguishing between dwellings and other buildings. 
Two conflicting results arise. While for dwellings is confirmed the known 
tendency to slightly overestimate imputed rents (about 156 billion euros 
according to the SILC Dataset and about 147 according to the matched 
datasets), the opposite occurs for other buildings; the estimated rents by means 
of our matched dataset are more than double than those obtained by employing 
only the SILC Dataset. Our result is a significant improvement not only in 
representing real estate estimates, but also their distribution. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
changes type of use within the tax year, PIT Data contains specific information for each 
period and each type of use. 
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Table 1 - Real or imputed rents from SILC vs matched dataset 
  SILC Matched Datasets Difference (%) 
Dwellings 155.7 146.5 -5.9 
Other buildings 41.5 90.5 118.0 
Note: Billion euros. 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
 
4. The Structure of the Microsimulation Model 
 
The microsimulation model is structured in seven stages; each stage is 
replicated for both the three types of tax returns and the residual group of 
taxpayers with no individual identifier in the SILC Dataset: 
1) reading and reorganizing all variables within the three surveys; 
2) evaluating the cadastral incomes and property tax base for each 
taxpayer; 
3) evaluating the tax credits for dependent individuals; 
4) evaluating the tax credits for earned incomes; 
5) evaluating the tax credits for items of expenditures; 
6) evaluating the gross and net tax liability and the whole transition from 
the pre- to the post-tax income for each individual, including regional and 
municipal surtaxes, apart from social contributions10 and family allowances11; 
7) evaluating property tax for each building owned by each taxpayer. 
The flow chart 1 can help to represent the logical and statistical steps of the 
model. 
With approximately 3,000 variables in PIT and Real Estate Datasets, the 
first goal is to create a set of algorithms able to replicate the transition from 
gross to net PIT income for all taxpayers within SILC Dataset. As all and 
detailed information on tax returns is available, broader peculiarities of the 
Italian PIT legislation can be simulated (for example special determination of 
taxable income or single type of tax detraction, such as for interest on loans, 
maintenance of the house, health expenditure, etc.).12 
                                                 
10 Depending on gross income, sector of activity, company size, age and other known 
parameters. 
11 Depending on all kind of incomes and the household structure. 
12 The detailed description of the structure of the Italian Personal Income Tax is out of 
the scope of this work. Suffice it to say, we were able to replicate all the peculiarities of the 
tax system, by translating in STATA and SPSS language the instructions for filling in the 
tax return forms made available by MEF. See Morini and Pellegrino (2014) for a 
presentation of the main characteristics of the Italian PIT structure we simulate in this work. 
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We built a specific set of algorithms for each type of tax return (“Unico”, 
“730” and “770”) for two reasons. First, the instructions for completing 
ordinary tax returns are sometimes different to those of the other two kinds of 
simplified tax returns. Second, how variables are collected and itemised by the 
tax authority differs according to the kind of tax return (“Unico”, “730” and 
“770”). 
This precise procedure can be done for almost all taxpayers within the 
survey, as complete information for a set of tax returns is available. For a few 
taxpayers (928 out of 32,010), for whom the tax return is not available, we 
obtained information from Survey 1 and replicated these tax returns as 
precisely as possible. 
At the end of this procedure, we had the necessary algorithms for 
replicating the PIT structure. Moreover, by observing the original gross and net 
PIT incomes reported by respondents in SILC Dataset, we could also compare 
these distributions and give a reliable estimation of the differences, one of 
which is a portion of PIT evasion. 
A similar strategy was employed for replicating a complete set of 
information regarding each individual’s property and for evaluating the 
corresponding property taxes. Again, for the few taxpayers for whom the 
individual identifier was not available, we completed our set of information by 
following the strategy described in the previous sections. 
Stages two to six recalculate all structures of personal income tax, whilst 
stages two and seven recalculate the structure of the property tax. 
Algorithms were written to obtain evaluated values of the microsimulation 
exactly equal (only rounding differences were tolerated) to the corresponding 
ones observed within the tax return. This was done for all taxpayers. 
In so doing, we also corrected possible mistakes by taxpayers or business 
consultants when completing their tax return (e.g. an erroneous value of a tax 
credit for a spouse with respect to the taxpayer’s gross income, or an erroneous 
tax credit for a child claimed by the father as the child earns a higher income 
allowing the tax credit for the father; and so on). This has an important 
consequence: this model can take into account the true net tax liability as 
identified by the automatic audits carried out by the tax authority. 
 
11 
 
Flow Chart 1- Logical and statistical steps of the model 
 
 Source:Own elaborations. 
 
 
5. Outputs with Respect to 2009 Fiscal Year 
 
Having simulated peculiarities of the tax returns, we can now turn to some 
important results of the simulation, and to their comparison with the official 
statistics made available by MEF. We began by comparing the microsimulation 
model to the official statistics in the fiscal year 2009. As we employed a 
12 
 
representative sample of the Italian population selected by ISTAT, the sample 
weight played an important role in an exhaustive replication of real taxes, even 
when employing a full set of real tax returns. 
According to the official statistics made available by MEF for 2009 fiscal 
year, the overall number of PIT taxpayers was approximately 41.5 million, 
whilst the overall gross income amounted to approximately 783.3 billion euro. 
By applying the original weighted samples of SILC Dataset, the number of 
overall taxpayers in the microsimulation model is 39.8 million, about 4.2 
percent less than expected (that is, by the way, a good approximation), whilst 
the amount registered by the microsimulation model is 3 percent lower (751 
billion euros). 
By considering SILC and PIT Datasets, Table 2 compares aggregate 
original overall amount of gross income by source of income, and shows the 
percentage difference. It is of great evidence the underreporting of incomes, 
mainly due to tax evasion: the underreporting of self-employed incomes is 
about a half, whilst it is about 6 and 1 percent for labor and retirement income, 
respectively. The picture we obtain with our elaborations confirms previous 
estimation of tax evasion, e.g. those obtained by D’Amuri and Florio (2005). 
 
Table 2 - A comparison between incomes within SILC and PIT Datasets 
  SILC Dataset PIT Dataset Difference (%) 
Employee income 446.6 420.2 -5.9 
Retirement income 226.7 224.8 -0.8 
Self-employed income 205.8 106.0 -48.5 
Total 879.1 751.0 -14.6 
Note: Billion euros.   
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
Turning to the overall number of taxpayers, and by employing original 
sample weights, we obtained a composition of taxpayers by source of income 
very close to the official fiscal statistics: about 40 million taxpayers against 
41.5 million according to the official statistics.13 The missing 1.5 million 
taxpayers can be due to the underreporting of income sources of a very small 
amount within SILC Dataset; however, these small incomes are registered 
within PIT and Real Estate Datasets. 
Starting from this picture, we improve the goodness of fit for our model by 
changing the weights of the household sample. We employ the reweighting 
methodology proposed by ISTAT (2005) in its Genesees programme, and 
                                                 
13 Without these manipulations, and using the original sample weight, we obtain only 
about 38.6 million taxpayers and consequently, a lower value for the overall gross income. 
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considered a large set of variables for the reweighting, basically all available 
household socio-economic characteristics, overall number of PIT taxpayers by 
gross income class, type of work. The main goal of the re-sampling strategy is 
twofold: a) to calibrate the PIT variable of the model with a higher degree of 
accuracy; b) to not modify the distribution of households by socio-economic 
characteristics. Table 3 presents the results comparing the overall number of 
individual PIT taxpayers and the overall amount for the most relevant tax 
variables by applying the re-weighted sample weights. As can be seen, the 
results are very close to the official statistics for all variables. 
 
Table 3 - Number of PIT taxpayers and tax amounts - 2009 fiscal year 
  Number of taxpayers  (million) 
          Amounts 
        (billion euro) 
Variables MEF Model MEF Model 
Gross income 41.52 41.34 783.25 788.88 
Taxable income 39.89 40.25 753.94 755.06 
Gross tax liability 39.02 40.25 202.62 203.24 
Net tax liability 31.01 30.53 146.49 146.66 
Regional surtax 30.85 30.53 8.33 8.31 
Municipal surtax 25.59 25.17 3.01 3.08 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
The only relevant difference regards the number of taxpayers with a 
positive gross tax liability. There is a technical explanation for this difference. 
Current tax return instructions say that pensioners with a gross income of less 
than 7,500 euro, who own their main residence, have to show a nil gross tax 
liability even if it is positive. We prefer to keep an evaluated gross tax liability 
that does not affect the overall estimation of taxpayers who pay no net taxes 
and the overall amount of the gross tax liability. 
Appendix A supplies several figures showing the distributions of taxpayers 
by gross income classes as well as the average values by income classes for 
several tax variables according to our microsimulation model and to the official 
statistics made available by MEF. In more details, we provides figures for 
gross income, taxable income, gross tax liability, net tax liability. 
Given the absolute similarity for all tax variables in the transition from the 
pre- to the post-tax income, our microsimulation model can be successfully 
employed to estimate the effects on taxpayers of changes in the PIT structure, 
one of the main reasons why this model was developed by MEF. 
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6. A First Application of the Model: the 2013 Fiscal Year 
 
Once the model was applied to the year of the first datasets, a further step 
was to update it to the 2013 fiscal year. In order to proceed in this direction, 
three phases had to be considered: a) to update the algorithms described in 
Section 3 according to the 2013 tax rules; b) to update the monetary values 
from 2009 to 2013; and c) to establish a new set of sample weights to take into 
account changes in the period 2009-2013 concerning both the population size 
and the composition of taxpayers. 
With regards to phase a) several differences in changes to tax laws between 
2009 and 2013 were simulated. Beginning in 2012, rents can be considered to 
be a part of PIT gross income or can be taxed with a proportional rate (21 or 19 
percent according to the type of rent) according to the taxpayer’s choice; 
income from not rented buildings are no longer taken into account in the 
definition of PIT gross income; a new set of tax credits for children has been 
introduced; tax credit for restructuring charges has increased from 36 to 50 
percent; the group of 20 percent tax credits has been removed; a 3 per cent 
“solidarity contribution” (deductible from the gross income) for taxpayers 
earning more than 300,000 euro has been introduced; and finally, tax rates for 
regional and municipal surtaxes have changed. 
Turning to phases b) and c), updating data was processed in two different 
steps. When the model was built only official statistics from the fiscal year 
2011 were available. We updated all the relevant income variables from 2009 
to 2013, according to reliable hypotheses connected to zero growth of GDP and 
the very low inflation rate. We applied different rules: retirement incomes had 
been updated following the rules of pension schemes in the period 2009-2013; 
labour incomes of private employees had been updated by 2 percent yearly; 
labour incomes of public employees had not been updated because of the wage 
freeze of the last years; income of self-employed taxpayers as well as 
deductions and tax credits for items of expenditures had been updated by 2 
percent yearly, following the available statistics made available by National 
Accounts. Finally, cadastral income of buildings and deduction for donations 
had not been updated since they did not change. The re-weighting procedure 
was similarly employed, as cited in Section 4, whilst the updating of incomes 
was simulated by applying nominal changes observed for different types of 
taxpayers belonging to each income class, according to the MEF official 
statistics for 2009-2011, and to national accounts for 2011-2013. 
 
6.1. Income taxes 
 
In this section we present results regarding income taxation and consider 
both taxpayers and equivalent households. Equivalent income distribution was 
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obtained by applying the equivalent scale determined by the squared root of the 
number of household members. As for the definition of income of each 
taxpayer, we consider the sum of two different sources of incomes: PIT gross 
income14, and income from “minimal taxpayers” (the so called “regime dei 
contribuenti minimi”). 
 
6.1.1. Income taxes considering taxpayers 
 
Table 4 shows the most important indices of inequality (see Appendix B for 
the definitions of inequality measures described in Tables 4 and 5) considering 
individual taxpayers. We evaluate different indices for the central government 
PIT and regional and municipal surtaxes. 
The Gini coefficient for gross income is equal to 46.059, showing a high 
level of inequality. 
Focusing on central government tax, the Gini coefficient for net incomes15 
is equal to 41.224, whilst the corresponding concentration coefficient is 
41.132. The overall redistributive effect (the difference between the Gini 
coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution and the corresponding Gini 
coefficient of the post-tax income distribution) is equal to 4.835, whilst the 
Reynolds-Smolensky indices (the difference between the Gini coefficient of 
the pre-tax income distribution and the corresponding concentration coefficient 
of the post-tax income distribution) is 4.927. 
Therefore, the Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index (the difference between the 
Gini coefficient of the post-tax income distribution and the corresponding 
concentration coefficient of the post-tax income distribution, also equal to the 
difference between the Reynolds-Smolensky index and the overall 
redistributive effect of the tax) is equal to 0.092, and denotes the re-ranking 
exerted by the tax. The Gini coefficient for the tax is 68.194, whilst the 
concentration coefficient is 66.910. These values indicate a high concentration 
of the tax liability, since the tax is progressive. The Kakwani index, given by 
the difference between the concentration coefficient of the tax liability 
distribution and the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution, is equal 
to 20.851. 
 
  
                                                 
14 For what concerns rents, they are included in the PIT definition of income up to 2011 
fiscal year. Starting from the 2012 fiscal year, taxpayer can choose a separate regime (the so 
called “cedolare secca sui canoni di locazione”). In these cases we continue considering 
rents as a component of income. 
15 Here we consider only the net tax liability accruing to the central government; 
therefore, each taxpayer’s net income is defined as the difference between the gross income 
and the central government tax (surtaxes are not considered). 
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Table 4 - Inequality indices for individual taxpayers 
Index Value 
Gini coefficient for the gross income 46.059 
Central government   
Gini coefficient for the net income 41.224 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 41.132 
Gini coefficient for the tax 68.194 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 66.910 
Average tax rate 19.113 
Redistributive effect 4.835 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 4.927 
Kakwani index 20.851 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index 0.092 
Regional government   
Gini coefficient for the tax 55.748 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 53.656 
Average tax rate 1.345 
Municipal government   
Gini coefficient for the tax 62.309 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 55.085 
Average tax rate 0.501 
Overall   
Gini coefficient for the net income 40.937 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 40.83 
Gini coefficient for the tax 66.961 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 65.777 
Average tax rate 20.959 
Redistributive effect 5.122 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 5.228 
Kakwani index 19.718 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index 0.107 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
Therefore, the degree of progression is very high, since the maximum 
admittable value of the Kakwani index is the difference between 1 and the Gini 
coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution. 
The Kakwani and the Reynolds-Smolensky indexes are linked by the 
overall average tax rate (the ratio between the sum of the tax liability of each 
taxpayer and the sum of the pre-tax income of each taxpayer), which amounts 
to 19.113 percent. 
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As expected, considering overall taxation16 we observe a greater average 
tax rate (20.959 percent), a greater Reynolds-Smolenky index (5.228), and a 
smaller Kakwani index (19.718).17 The corresponding overall redistributive 
effect is 5.122, whilst the Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index is equal to 0.107. 
Very few scientific analysis present the most important personal income tax 
redistributive indexes with respect to taxpayers. The values we obtained are 
very similar to those according to the official statistics made available my MEF 
(2010) for the period 2001-2007 and Martone (2008); considering other 
microsimulation model based on survey data, our results are very similar to 
those obtained by Morini and Pellegrino (2014). 
 
6.1.2. Personal income tax considering equivalent households 
 
Similarly to Table 4, Table 5 shows the same inequality indices with regard 
to equivalent households. The Gini coefficient for the gross income is equal to 
42.882. 
Focusing on central government tax, the Gini coefficient for net incomes is 
equal to 38.297, whilst the corresponding concentration coefficient is 38.221. 
Therefore, the overall redistributive effect is equal to 4.585, whilst the 
corresponding Reynolds-Smolenky is 4.661. The Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani 
index is then equal to 0.076. The Gini coefficient for the tax is 63.361, whilst 
the concentration coefficient is 62.471, so that the Kakwani indices is 19.589. 
The observed average tax rate is 19.222 percent. 
Considering overall taxation, the Gini coefficient for net income is 38.060, 
whilst the corresponding concentration coefficient is 37.970. The Gini 
coefficient for the tax is 62.129 and the concentration coefficient is 61.283. 
The overall average tax rate is 21.070 percent. We also observe that the 
Reynolds-Smolenky index is 4.912 and the Kakwani coefficient is 18.401. The 
overall redistributive effect is 4.822. 
  
                                                 
16 Here we consider both the net tax liability accruing to the central government and the 
surtaxes accruing to local governments; therefore, each taxpayer’s net income is defined as 
the difference between the gross income and the sum of central government tax and regional 
as well as municipal surtaxes. 
17 See Baldini et al. (2003) for the proof of these results. 
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Table 5 - Inequality indices for equivalent households 
  Indexes 
Gini coefficient for the gross income 42.882 
Central government   
Gini coefficient for the net income 38.297 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 38.221 
Gini coefficient for the tax 63.361 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 62.471 
Average tax rate 19.222 
Redistributive effect 4.585 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 4.661 
Kakwani index 19.589 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index 0.076 
Regional government   
Gini coefficient for the tax 50.43 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 48.537 
Average tax rate 1.347 
Municipal government   
Gini coefficient for the tax 57.599 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 49.973 
Average tax rate 0.501 
Overall   
Gini coefficient for the net income 38.06 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 37.97 
Gini coefficient for the tax 62.129 
Concentration coefficient for the tax 61.283 
Average tax rate 21.07 
Redistributive effect 4.822 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 4.912 
Kakwani index 18.401 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index 0.09 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
Table 6 shows the composition of gross income, net income and tax by 
deciles of equivalent households; the Table also shows the cut points of 
equivalent incomes at each decile. Before tax, the first ten percent of 
households receive only 0.8 percent of overall gross income, whilst the top ten 
percent of households receive 32.1 percent. Because of the tax, these 
proportions are compressed: the first ten percent of households receives 1 
percent of the post-tax incomes, whilst the top ten percent of households 
receives 28.3 percent. Note the first eighty percent of households receive a 
greater share of net income with respect to the pre-tax situation. Note also that 
19 
 
the top ten percent of households pay a little less than half of the overall net tax 
liability. 
 
Table 6 - Composition of incomes and tax by deciles 
Deciles Cut points of equivalent incomes Gross income Net tax liability Net income 
1 5,452 0.8 0.1 1 
2 9,140 3.6 0.4 4.4 
3 11,898 4.7 1.8 5.5 
4 14,863 6 3.5 6.7 
5 17,802 7.3 5.1 7.9 
6 21,014 8.6 6.8 9.1 
7 24,951 9.9 8.5 10.3 
8 30,253 12 11.3 12.1 
9 39,656 15 16 14.7 
10 1,659,799 32.1 46.5 28.3 
Total - 100 100 100 
Note: All households within the integrated Datasets have been considered.  
Source: Own elaborations.   
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the Pfähler (1990) decomposition of the Reynolds-
Smolensky index (see Appendix C for details). Considering both individual 
taxpayers and equivalent households, about 60 percent of the Reynolds-
Smolensky index is due to tax credits (and to dependent individuals and earned 
income ones in particular), whilst the remaining 40 percent is due to the tax 
rate schedule. As can be noted, allowances do not contribute to the overall 
Reynolds-Smolensky index. 
 
Table 7 - The Pfähler decomposition 
   Tax allowances
Rate Tax 
Total 
schedule credits 
Taxpayers -0.4 41.7 58.6 100 
Equivalent Households -0.7 40.7 60.0 100 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
 
6.2. Distribution of household wealth (real estate) 
 
In order to fully show the results of our microsimulation model, we discuss 
some specific statistics on buildings owned by households. Specifically, in 
what follows we consider equivalent values for the tax base of the Italian 
property tax (hereafter IMU). The Gini coefficient of the IMU tax base on 
main residence is equal to 55.843, whilst on other buildings it is equal to 
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84.308. Considering all buildings together, the Gini coefficient is equal to 
60.159. More than 70 percent of households own the main residence, whilst 
only one household out of three own at least one building. As a consequence, 
Gini coefficients show a high concentration of wealth among households, a 
concentration higher than those observed for incomes. 
If we evaluate the corresponding concentration coefficients of the IMU tax 
base once households are ordered according to their PIT income, this picture is 
resized: the concentration coefficient of the IMU tax base on main residence 
decreases to 22.860, whilst that on other buildings to 40.902. Considering all 
buildings together, the Gini coefficient is equal to 30.104. The high share of 
households who own at least one building can explain these differences. 
To sum up, Italian households appear to be “cash-poor” (about 2 taxpayers 
out of three declare a PIT income lower than 20 thousand euros) and “asset-
rich”. This dichotomy should be carefully considered when thinking of 
restructuring the whole tax system in order to both reduce inequality and boost 
economic growth: recent tax reforms in most European countries proposed a 
tax shift from direct to indirect as well as wealth taxation; given the budget 
constraints, Italy increased indirect and wealth taxation, whilst postponing the 
reduction of income taxation. On the redistributive point of view, such tax shift 
can cause ambiguous effect, since wealth taxation turns out to be progressive 
with respect to income whenever the ratio between wealth and income is 
increasing with income. Further statistics on wealth and income distributions 
can then help understanding this point. 
Table 8 shows the share of households owning at least one building by 
deciles of equivalent PIT income. In particular, Table 8 shows three columns. 
The first concerns the property of the main residence; the second, the property 
of other buildings (not only dwellings, but also every other type of building); 
and the third considers all buildings together. As can be noted, the higher the 
decile, the higher the share of household ownership for all the three columns. 
About 71 percent of households are owner-occupiers, but only 45 percent of 
households belong to the bottom ten percent, and more than 80 percent of 
households belong to the top three deciles. A different picture emerges 
regarding buildings other than the main residence. About one quarter of 
households belonging to the bottom ten percent who own at least one dwelling, 
whilst this proportion rises to about 72 percent for households in the top ten 
percent. 
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Table 8 - Share of households with positive IMU tax base by deciles of equivalent 
households PIT income 
Deciles IMU tax base Main residence 
IMU tax base 
Other buildings 
IMU tax base 
All buildings 
1 45.0 24.0 50.3 
2 58.4 28.9 63.4 
3 64.8 35.7 70.7 
4 66.8 37.8 72.2 
5 69.5 39.3 74.8 
6 76.1 43.5 81.7 
7 79.5 44.9 84.2 
8 81.6 50.5 88.0 
9 85.4 57.6 91.2 
10 88.0 71.7 95.5 
Total 71.1 43.2 76.8 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
More surprising are the results shown in Table 9. Here, we show the 
percentage ratio between the value of the IMU tax base and the amount of PIT 
gross income. 
 
Table 9 - Incidence of the IMU tax base on PIT income (%) 
Deciles IMU tax base Main residence 
IMU tax base 
Other buildings 
IMU tax base 
All buildings 
1 1,339.4 641.6 1,981.0 
2 409.4 173.9 583.2 
3 332.0 169 501.0 
4 275.7 143.6 419.3 
5 257.4 129.0 386.5 
6 264.7 117.8 382.5 
7 238.0 112.4 350.4 
8 200.1 126.5 326.6 
9 189.6 133.5 323.2 
10 143.1 169.4 312.5 
Total 221.6 148.5 370.1 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
As can be seen, Italian households have a high value of wealth with respect 
to their annual income: 221.6 percent for the main residence, 148.5 percent for 
buildings other than their main residence, and about 370 percent for all 
buildings together. Moreover, it has to be considered that the IMU tax base is, 
on average, about a half of the corresponding market value of the buildings. 
Even if the ratio between wealth and income is not increasing with income, 
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these ratios are very high for all households, and incredibly for those belonging 
to the bottom ten percent (1,339.4, 641.6 and 1,981 percent, respectively) 
compared to those registered to the top ten percent (143.1, 169.4 and 312.5 
percent, respectively). 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we presented and discussed a first attempt to develop a 
microsimulation model for Italy aimed to well simulate detailed tax and benefit 
rules and their possible change, preserving distributional information. On the 
one hand it considers a representative sample of the Italian population made 
available by the Italian National Institute of Statistics; on the other, it matches 
all income units from this survey with one to one information contained within 
the administrative data of both personal income tax returns and the building 
register, provided by the Department of Finance of the Italian Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. Given this integrated amount of information, we 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these datasets, and then explain in 
greater detail each stage to obtain our microsimulation model. Finally, we 
present some results of this model, used by the research unit of the Department 
of Finance of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance for study and 
support purposes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1 - Frequency density function for gross income 
 
Figure 2a - Distribution of taxpayers by gross income classes - Taxable income 
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Figure 2b - Average value for taxable income by gross income classes 
 
Figure 3a - Distribution of taxpayers by gross income classes - Gross tax liability 
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Figure 3b - Average value for gross tax liability by gross income classes 
 
Figure 4a - Distribution of taxpayers by gross income classes - Net tax liability 
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Figure 4b - Average value for net tax liability by gross income classes 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Let x1, x2, …, xn be the pre-tax income levels associated to n income units. 
The corresponding post-tax income levels and tax levels are z1, z2, …, zn and 
T1, T2, …, Tn, respectively. We denote the pre-tax and the post-tax income 
distribution as well as the tax distribution by X, Z and T, respectively. 
Inequality among pre- and post-tax income levels as well as tax levels can 
be evaluated by the Gini coefficient, which ranges from zero to 1. Let GX, GZ 
and GT, be the corresponding Gini coefficient for pre-tax income, post-tax 
incomes and taxes, respectively. Then, 
  

 
 )(,cov2 FG 
  
where =X,Z,T,  is the average value for pre-tax and post-tax incomes and 
taxes, cov represents the covariance and F() is the cumulative distribution 
function. 
After the tax, it is not guaranteed that post-tax ordering be equal to the pre-
tax income one. It is most likely that these two orderings differ because of the 
re-ranking due to the tax. Therefore, the inequality of Z and T can be evaluated 
once these distributions are ordered according to the corresponding pre-tax 
incomes, ranked in a non-decreasing order. For what concerns post-tax 
incomes and taxes, the corresponding concentration coefficients can then be 
evaluated as follows: 
  

 
 )(,cov2 XFC 
. 
Progressive taxation produces two different effects on the distribution of 
pre-tax incomes: post-tax income inequality is lower than that measured on 
pre-tax income distribution, whilst tax inequality is greater. The first effect is 
known as the redistributive effect of the tax and the second one as departure 
from proportionality of the progressive taxation (Lambert, 2001). The overall 
redistributive effect of the tax RE is equal to RE = GX – GZ = (GX - CZ) - (GZ – 
CZ) = RS - RAPK, where RS = (GX – CZ) is the Reynolds-Smolensky index, 
whilst RAPK = Gz – CZ is the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index. The more the 
tax is progressive, the greater RE and RS; the more the tax causes re-ranking, 
the greater the negative contribution of re-ranking to the overall redistributive 
effect. The departure from proportionality of the progressive taxation can 
instead be evaluated by the Kakwani index K = CT – GX. The Kakwani and the 
Reynolds-Smolensky indexes are linked by the overall average tax rate, namely 
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As a consequence, 
KRS 

 1 . 
This formula tells us that the Reynolds-Smolensky index has two 
determinants: the overall average tax rate and the Kakwani index. 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
According to Pfähler (1990) and Lambert (2001), it is possible to ‘decompose’ 
the RS index in the contributions due to deductions, the rate schedule and the 
ax credits. Here we follow the methodology summarised by Urban (2006). The 
‘share’ of RS and K due to the deductions can be evaluated as follows: 
 
   XDYXD GCCGRS  

1  
where 
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1
1
 
and KD = CD – GX, and Y is the taxable income. 
The ‘share’ of RS and K due to the marginal tax rate schedule can be evaluated 
as follows: 
   YGTGTYYRATE CCCCRS   

1  
where 
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and KRATE = CGT - CY. 
Finally, the ‘share’ of RS and K due to tax credits can be evaluated as follows: 
   XCXCXC GCGCRS   

1  
where 
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and KC = CC - GX. 
Hence, the overall RS can be decomposed as: 

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